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Abstract

Litigation

In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, the Supreme Court of
California rejected the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’
SEARCH

“narrow restraint” exception to California Business and
>>

Professional Code section 16600 regarding the
unenforceability of covenants not to compete (CNCs).
Edwards affirms that, unless the agreement falls within a

Shidler Center
UW School of Law

statutory exception, CNCs in employment agreements are
invalid as a matter of law in California because of California's
strong interest in protecting employee mobility as codified in
section 16600. Despite California’s strong public policy
against CNCs, an employee who wins the race to a California
courthouse may not necessarily benefit from section 16600
if the employee was not a California resident or employed by
a Californian employer at the time she agreed to a CNC. This
Article evaluates California law and the resolution of the
conflict of law issues that arise between California and other
states more willing to enforce CNCs.
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INTRODUCTION
<1>While

states generally disfavor covenants not to compete

(CNCs) because such agreements restrain trade, most states will
enforce CNCs in employment contracts 2 when the restraint on
trade is reasonable.3 However, the State of California has
adopted a restrictive policy regarding CNCs. 4 In Edwards v.
Arthur Andersen LLP, the California Supreme Court confirmed
that CNCs in employment agreements are per se illegal pursuant
to section 16600 of the California Business and Professional
Code, unless a clear statutory exception exists. 5 The court’s
bright-line interpretation expressly overruled the Ninth Circuit
Court of Appeals’ “narrow restraint” exception, which had
permitted enforcement of CNCs as long as the restraint on trade
was minimal or limited. 6
<2>In

applying the per se rule, the Edwards Court found the

CNC, which prevented Edwards from performing accounting
services for clients he had worked with during the previous
eighteen months of his former employment with Arthur
Anderson, restricted Edwards’s ability to practice his trade as an
accountant and was, therefore, unenforceable.7 The CNC was
considered an impermissible restraint on Edwards’s trade,
regardless of his ability to pursue new clients upon his
separation from Arthur Anderson. While Edwards stands for the
proposition that California’s strong public policy favors absolutely
open competition and employee mobility, regardless of the
extent of the restraint, it is unclear the extent to which nonresident employees may take advantage of California’s policy to
escape enforcement of CNCs that would otherwise be
enforceable.
<3>To

determine whether California’s law, or the law of a state

more willing to enforce a CNC, applies to a given case, courts
perform a conflict of law analysis. In general, the law of the
state with the most substantial connections to a cause of
action 8 and the more material public policy 9 will control.
Where multiple states have substantial connections, California’s
strong, material public policy against restraining trade appears
to weigh against enforcing CNCs. However, other states have
equally material public policy interests, such as New York’s
policy to protect parties’ freedom to contract.10 In light of these
competing policies, this Article examines the following: first,
California’s policy against CNCs; second, California’s valid
exceptions to the per se invalidity of CNCs; and finally, the state
courts’ resolution of the conflict of law issues that arise between
California and states more willing to enforce CNCs.

COVENANTS NOT TO COMPETE ARE INVALID AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
CALIFORNIA
<4>California,

in general, invalidates CNCs as a result of the

state’s strong public policy disfavoring restraints on trade and
the plain meaning of section 16600 of the California Business
and Professional Code. 11 Section 16600, as well as its
predecessor, section 1673 of the California Civil Code, 12 was
adopted to promote open competition and employee mobility.13
The policy aims not only to protect an individual’s right to
pursue the profession, trade or business of his or her choosing,
but also to protect an employer’s ability to compete for skilled
employees.14
<5>Section

16600 states that “[e]xcept as provided in this

chapter, every contract by which anyone is restrained from
engaging in a lawful profession, trade, or business of any kind is
to that extent void.”15 California courts have interpreted the
plain meaning of section 16600 broadly to hold that every
contract that restrains either the quantity or quality of trade is
unenforceable.16 In Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, the
California Supreme Court held that the plain meaning of section
16600, read in light of California’s policy against CNCs,
characterizes any CNC that restrains even a narrow portion of a
person’s ability to engage in her profession, trade, or business,
as an unenforceable restraint on trade. 17 In so holding,
Edwards not only rejects reading a rule of reason analysis into
the statute, which is consistent with previous California case
law,18 but also rejects the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow restraint”
exception. 19
<6>In

Edwards, the defendant employer, Arthur Andersen,

argued that a de facto rule of reason should be read into section
16600 to permit reasonable restraints on trade, as long as such
restraints do not completely prohibit a trade. 20 Arthur Andersen
sought to have the statutory term “restrained” be interpreted to
mean “prohibited,” such that only contracts that completely
prohibit an employee in the practice of a profession, trade, or
business are invalid. 21 The California Supreme Court rejected
this interpretation of the statute, noting that “section 16600 is
unambiguous . . .” and that “. . . if the Legislature intended the
statute to apply only to restraints that were unreasonable or
overbroad, it could have included language to that effect.” 22
The Edwards Court concluded that the plain meaning of the
term “restrained” must stand to mean that “any limitation”
contractually imposed on an employee’s trade is

unenforceable.23 As such, the court rejected Arthur Andersen’s
assertion that section 16600 includes a de facto rule of reason.
<7>In

addition, the Edwards Court declined to adopt the Ninth

Circuit’s “narrow restraint” exception to section 16600. 24 The
Ninth Circuit had previously interpreted California law as
providing an exception to the general invalidity of CNCs when a
CNC only restrains a small or limited part of a person’s trade. 25
However, the California Supreme Court was not persuaded by
the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation. 26 Relying on the unambiguous
language of section 16600, the court rejected the position that
a “narrow restraint” exception could ever be intended by the
legislature, because California’s policy is clear that CNCs are per
se invalid. 27 As such, Edwards articulates a strong public policy
to void any CNC, regardless of whether the restraint is narrowly
construed, or only partially prohibits an individual’s practice of a
trade, business, or profession. The only exceptions to the per se
invalidity of CNCs recognized by the California Supreme Court
are expressly codified in California’s statutory law.

CALIFORNIA’S CODIFIED EXCEPTIONS FOR WHEN A COVENANT NOT TO
COMPETE WILL BE ENFORCEABLE
<8>Because

California has a per se rule against CNCs, the

legislature created exceptions to permit the enforcement of
CNCs in circumstances where a business would otherwise be
harmed.28 For example, the California Business and Professional
Code allows enforcement of a CNC when the covenant involves
the sale or dissolution of a corporation, 29 partnership or limited
liability company.30 This exception protects a newly sold
business from being undermined by a past owner who
immediately opens a similar business that would unfairly
compete with the original business.
<9>A

second statutory exception allows enforcement of CNCs

that prevent use or disclosure of an employer’s trade secrets. 31
For instance, in Gordon v. Landau, the California Supreme Court
enforced a one-year CNC preventing a former employee from
using the employer’s proprietary customer lists, as long as the
former employee was not restrained from engaging in his
profession.32 The trade secret exception is limited to preventing
only the unlawful use or disclosure of a trade secret and does
not extend to CNCs that prevent an employee from working for
a competitor.

33

Because California courts have only found the

trade secret exception applicable where the CNC is limited to
protecting an employer’s property right to proprietary
information, the availability of the trade secret exception has

largely depended on whether the proprietary information
qualifies as a trade secret under the Uniform Trade Secret
Act. 34

RESOLVING CONFLICT OF LAWS
<10> Section

16600 clearly invalidates all CNCs in California

whether they are created by a resident employer or created for
a resident employee.35 What remains less clear is the effect of
section 16600 on a non-resident employer who requests
enforcement of a CNC against a non-resident employee who is
later hired to work in California. The central issue is whether the
former non-resident employee can successfully escape
enforcement of an otherwise valid CNC. The following sections of
this Article will examine the validity of contractual choice of law
provisions and the success of anti-suit injunctions when a nonresident employee seeks to prevent a non-resident employer
from enforcing the CNC in a court outside of California.

California Courts May Not Enforce Choice of Law Provisions
<11> When

there is a conflict of law, California refers to sections

187 and 188 of the Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws to
determine whether California or a foreign state’s laws should
apply.36 When there is a valid choice of law provision,37
California will generally apply the chosen state’s law 38 unless
the issue before the court concerns enforcing a CNC. 39 Section
187 suggests that a court may disregard a choice of law
provision when:
Application of the law of the chosen state would be
contrary to a fundamental policy of a state which
has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue
and which, under the rule of § 188, would be the
state of the applicable law in the absence of an
effective choice of law by the parties. 40
<12> The

California Supreme Court has interpreted section 187 to

mean that a choice of law provision will not be upheld if
California’s public policy is violated by the application of a
foreign state’s law, even where the foreign state has a
substantial relationship with the parties. 41 Californian courts
ask three questions to determine whether a foreign state’s law
violates California’s public policy: (1) whether the foreign state’s
law is contrary to a fundamental policy of California; (2)
whether California has a materially greater interest than the

foreign state, which is also known as the material interest
prong; and (3) whether California’s interest would be more
seriously impaired by enforcement of the foreign state law,
which is also referred to as the comparative interest prong.42
<13> For

example, in Application Group, Inc. v. Hunter Group,

Inc., Hunter Group, a Maryland corporation, sought to enforce
an employee’s CNC, which included a Maryland choice of law
provision, when a former employee moved to California and
began working for Hunter’s competitor, Application Group. 43
The appellate court determined that while the CNC would be
enforceable under Maryland law, the three-pronged conflict of
law analysis nevertheless required application of California
law.44 Significantly, the court not only found that California had
a greater material interest, but also that California employers
would be comparatively more seriously impaired if Hunter
Group’s CNC was enforced. 45 The court reasoned that when
non-resident employers are free to recruit California employees
and California employers are not free to recruit skilled
employees from states where CNCs are enforced, California
employers are unfairly disadvantaged.46 Under the reasoning of
Application Group, any choice of law provision attached to a CNC
will be difficult to enforce in California. 47
<14> However,

California state and federal courts do not appear

consistent in enforcing choice of law provisions.48 The Ninth
Circuit is more likely to uphold a choice of law provision,
possibly to avoid forum shopping.49 For instance, in IBM Corp.
v. Bajorek, the Ninth Circuit relied on its “narrow restraint”
exception to section 16600 to hold that California’s fundamental
public policy against CNCs is not violated when a CNC is a
limited restraint on an employee’s trade. 50 Because
enforcement of such a CNC would not violate public policy, the
threshold question in a conflict of laws analysis under the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 187(whether
enforcement would violate California’s fundamental public
policy(was not met. 51 The Ninth Circuit, therefore, held that the
choice of law provision must be enforced. 52
<15> The

California Supreme Court’s decision in Edwards to

overrule the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow restraint” exception will, by
implication, likely influence the Ninth Circuit’s conflict of laws
analysis.53 While the enforcement of a CNC is clearly a violation
of California public policy after Edwards, whether the federal
courts will align with California state courts in declining to
uphold choice of law provisions remains unanswered. Federal
courts may continue to enforce choice of law provisions by

weighing the additional prongs of the conflict of law analysis—
the material interest and comparative interest prongs—in favor
of a foreign state.
<16> Thus,

the holdings in Edwards and Application Group

provide significant hurdles to employers trying to enforce choice
of law provisions in California state courts, and possibly federal
courts applying California law. The likely invalidity of choice of
law provisions may discourage non-resident employers from
seeking enforcement of CNCs in California, but employers may
still seek a legal remedy in their own state courts.

Winning the Race to a California Courthouse Does Not Ensure Adjudication by
a California Court
<17> Because

a CNC is likely unenforceable in California, non-

resident employees may race to file for a declaratory judgment
in California before an employer is able to enforce a CNC in its
own state court. 54 In general, an employee may increase the
likelihood of obtaining a judgment from a particular state court
by winning the race to the courthouse and requesting the court
to issue an anti-suit injunction barring an employer from
pursuing claims in a foreign state court. Under the first-to-file
rule, a California court that acquires jurisdiction prior to another
state’s court may proceed with a case exclusively; any
subsequent courts, in accordance with judicial comity, may
decline jurisdiction over suits concerning the same parties and
subject matter.55 In addition, to avoid multiplicity of judicial
proceedings, a California court may issue an anti-suit injunction,
such as a temporary restraining order (TRO) or preliminary
injunction, to prevent a defendant from pursuing a lawsuit in a
foreign state when a plaintiff has already commenced suit in
California. 56 However, the California Supreme Court has
cautioned against the use of a TRO when an employee files suit
in California to avoid unfavorable substantive law regarding the
enforcement of CNCs and has declined to invoke the first-to-file
rule to proceed in CNC cases where a parallel suit is filed in a
foreign jurisdiction. 57
<18> For

example, in Advanced Bionics Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc.,

a Medtronic employee residing in Minnesota agreed to a CNC
and to a Minnesota choice of law provision.58 After the
employee resigned to pursue employment in California with a
Californian company and Medtronic competitor, the employee
and the competing company, Advanced Bionics, filed suit in
California for declaratory judgment to prevent Medtronic from
enforcing the CNC. 59 Medtronic responded by filing a parallel
60

suit in Minnesota.

The California appellate court determined,

after conducting a choice of law analysis, that California law
should be applied and subsequently issued a TRO preventing the
Minnesota action from continuing.61 On review, the California
Supreme Court recognized a court’s inherent power to issue a
TRO, but held that a TRO could not be used to restrain a former
employer from enforcing a CNC in another state’s court without
violating the principles of judicial restraint and comity. 62 The
court stated that the principles of judicial restraint and comity
require an exceptional circumstance to enjoin litigation through
a TRO, and that such a circumstance was not present in
Advanced Bionics.63 In other words, California’s public policy
against enforcement of CNCs was not sufficient to qualify as an
exceptional circumstance to enjoin litigation in a foreign state. 64
<19> As

such, while California courts may proceed with a case

under the first-to-file rule and issue TROs when there are
parallel suits filed in another jurisdiction, the courts are likely to
defer to the jurisdiction of a foreign state when a case concerns
the enforcement of a CNC for a non-resident employee and
employer.

CONCLUSION
<20> In

Edwards, the California Supreme Court overruled

application of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals’ “narrow
restraint” exception to section 16600. Edwards reiterates the
rule that CNCs are per se unenforceable unless such covenants
fall within an express statutory exception. The unenforceability
of CNCs in California effects employers nationwide when former
employees seek declaratory judgments in California courts,
which are likely to hold CNCs unenforceable regardless of a
choice of law provision selecting a state with more favorable
treatment of CNCs. However, the holding of Advanced Bionics
limits the affect of California per se treatment of CNCs by
preventing a California court from issuing a TRO to prevent
parallel litigation in another state, even where parties filed first
in California, or when a conflict of law analysis reveals that
California law should be applied. The unavailability of the firstto-file rule and an anti-suit injunction for a former employee
seeking declaratory judgment in California implicitly allows a
former employer to pursue litigation in a foreign state, at least
until a judgment binds the parties. 65 Ultimately, it may become
a race to judgment to determine whether a CNC will be
enforced.

PRACTICE POINTERS
While CNCs are not, in general, enforceable in
California, a California court may find a CNC
enforceable under one of the statutory exceptions to
section 16600, where the CNC is designed to
protect: (1) an employer’s trade secret; or (2) a
newly acquired corporation, partnership, or limited
liability company.
Choice of law provisions designed to apply the law
of states that enforce reasonable CNCs are likely
unenforceable in California courts because of the
state’s strong public policy against CNCs.
Because the Ninth Circuit’s “narrow restraint”
exception was overruled by Edwards, removing suit
from state to federal court may not provide the type
of leverage it once did. However, the Ninth Circuit
may still be more receptive than California state
courts to arguments favoring enforcement of a
choice of law provision where an employer can
demonstrate that: (1) California lacks a materially
greater interest; or (2) California would be less
impaired than would an employer’s home state, if
the CNC were to be enforced.
An employee seeking declaratory judgment in
California has the greatest chance of success if the
court awards the declaratory judgment before the
former employer files suit in another state that
treats CNCs more favorably. If an employee suit
commences in a California court; nevertheless, a
former employer can still improve the likelihood that
a CNC will be enforced by commencing a parallel suit
in another employer’s home state and winning the
race to judgment.
<< Top

Footnotes
1. Sheri Wardwell, University of Washington School of
Law, J.D. program Class of 2010. Thank you to
Professor Jane K. Winn of the University of
Washington School of Law for her help and guidance
during the writing of this Article. Also, thank you to
Professor Dwight Drake of the University of
Washington School of Law for his thoughtful review
of this Article.

2. States applying a common law “rule of reason” to
assess enforcement of a CNC are as follows: Alaska
(Data Mgmt., Inc. v. Green, 757 P.2d 62, 65 (Alaska
1988)); Arizona (Am. Credit Bureau, Inc. v. Carter,
462 P.2d 838, 840 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1969)); Arkansas
(Dawson v. Temps Plus, Inc., 987 S.W.2d 722, 727
(Ark. 1999)); Connecticut (Van Dyck Printing Co. v.
DiNicola, 648 A.2d 898, 902 (Conn. Super. Ct.
1993)); Delaware (Faw, Casson & Co. v. Cranston,
375 A.2d 463, 467 (Del. Ch. 1977)); District of
Columbia (Ellis v. James V. Hurson Assocs., 565 A.2d
615, 617 (D.C. Cir. 1989); Florida (FLa. Stat . §
542.335); Georgia (Sysco Food Servs. of Atlanta,
Inc. v. Chupp, 484 S.E.2d 323, 325 (Ga. Ct. App.
1997); but see Ga. Const. Art. III, Sec. VI, Par.
V(c)); Hawaii (Technicolor, Inc. v. Traeger, 551 P.2d
163 (Haw. 1976); see also The 7’s Enters., Inc. v.
Del Rosario, 143 P.3d 23, 36 (Haw. 2006)); Idaho
(Dick v. Geist, 693 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Idaho Ct. App.
1985)); Illinois (Lawrence & Allen, Inc. v. Cambridge
Human Res. Group, Inc., 685 N.E.2d 434, 441 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1997)); Indiana (Norlund v. Faust, 675
N.E.2d 1142, 1153 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997)); Iowa
(Revere Transducers, Inc. v. Deere & Co., 595
N.W.2d 751, 762 (Iowa 1999)); Kansas (Weber v.
Tillman, 913 P.2d 84, 89 (Kan. 1996)); Kentucky
(Hall v. Willard & Woolsey, P.S.C., 471 S.W.2d 316,
317 (Ky.1971)); Maine (Brignull v. Albert, 666 A.2d
82, 84 (Me. 1995)); Maryland (Ecology Servs., Inc.
v. Clym Env’t Servs., LLC, 952 A.2d 999, 1007 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 2008)); Massachusetts (Boulanger v.
Dunkin' Donuts Inc., 815 N.E.2d 572, 577 (Mass.
2004)); Michigan (St. Clair Medical, P.C. v. Borgiel,
715 N.W.2d 914, 918-19 (Mich. Ct. App. 2006));
Minnesota (Dynamic Air, Inc. v. Bloch, 502 N.W.2d
796, 799 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993)); Mississippi
(Empiregas, Inc. of Kosciusko v. Bain, 599 So.2d
971, 975 (Miss. 1992)); Missouri (Cont’l Research
Corp. v. Scholz, 595 S.W.2d 396, 400 (Mo. Ct. App.
1980); Nebraska (Chambers-Dobson, Inc. v. Squier,
472 N.W.2d 391, 397 (Neb. 1991)); Nevada (Camco,
Inc. v. Baker, 936 P.2d 829, 833 (Nev. 1997)); New
Hampshire (Smith, Batchelder & Rugg v. Foster, 406
A.2d 1310, 1312 (N.H. 1979)); New Jersey (Solari
Indus. v. Malady, 264 A.2d 53, 57 (N.J. 1970)); New
Mexico (Lovelace Clinic v. Murphy, 417 P.2d 450,
453-54 (N.M. 1966)); New York (Morris v. Schroder
Capital Mgmt. Int’l, 7 N.Y.3d 616, 620 (N.Y. 2006));

North Carolina (Chemimetals Processing, Inc. v.
McEneny, 476 S.E.2d 374, 376 (N.C. Ct. App.
1996)); Ohio (Raimonde v. Van Vlerah, 325 N.E.2d
544, 546-47 (Ohio 1975)); Pennsylvania (Hess v.
Gebhard & Co., 808 A.2d 912, 920 (Pa. 2002));
Rhode Island (Durapin, Inc. v. Am. Prods, Inc., 559
A.2d 1051, 1053 (R.I. 1989)); South Carolina (Cafe
Assocs., Ltd. v. Gerngross, 406 S.E.2d 162, 164
(S.C. 1991)); Tennessee (Vantage Tech., LLC v.
Cross, 17 S.W.3d 637, 644 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999));
Texas (Tex. Bus. & Com. Code §§15.50-.52 (2001));
Utah (Kasco Servs. Corp. v. Benson, 831 P.2d 86,
95 (Utah 1992)); Vermont (Roy’s Orthopedic, Inc. v.
Lavigne, 454 A.2d 1242, 1244 (Vt. 1982)); Virginia
(New River Media Group, Inc. v. Knighton, 429
S.E.2d 25, 26 (Va. 1993)); Washington (Knight, Vale
& Gregory v. McDaniel, 680 P.2d 448, 451-52 (Wash
Ct. App. 1984)); West Virginia (Reddy v. Cmty.
Health Found. of Man, 298 S.E.2d 906, 915 (W. Va.
1982)); Wisconsin (WIs. Stat. Ann. § 103.465
(2009)); Wyoming (Hopper v. All Pet Animal Clinic,
Inc., 861 P.2d 531, 543 (Wyo. 1993)). See also
BRIan M. MaLsbERgER, COvEnants NOt

tO

COMpEtE:

a

StatE-

By -StatE SuRvEy (5th ed. 2006).
3. To determine enforceability of a CNC under a “rule of
reason” analysis, a court may examine whether the
CNC (1) furthers a legitimate interest of an
employer, (2) is reasonably necessary to protect the
employer, (3) is reasonable in time and place, (4) is
supported by adequate consideration, (5) is in the
public interest, and (6) poses no undue hardship on
the employee. See REstatEMEnt (SEcOnD)

Of

COntRacts

§§186-188 (1981).
4. California appears to have one of the nation’s
strictest public policies against enforcement of CNCs.
See CaL. Bus. & PROf. CODE § 16600 (West Supp.
2008). Notably, North Dakota also restricts CNCs.
See N.D. CEnt. CODE § 9-08-06 (2008). The following
states restrict CNCs by statute, but as interpreted,
are more tolerant of enforcing CNCs than California:
Alabama (ALa. CODE § 8-1-1 (2009)); Colorado (COLO.
REv. Stat. § 8-2-113 (2009)); Louisiana (La. REv.
Stat. § 23:921 (2008)); Montana (MOnt. CODE § 282-703 (2008)); Oklahoma (OkLa. Stat. tit. 15, §§
217-219 (2009)); Oregon (OR. REv. Stat. § 653.295
(2009)); South Dakota (S.D. CODIfIED Laws §§ 53-9-8
to 53-9-11 (2009)). See also BRIan M. MaLsbERgER,
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COMpEtE:
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StatE-By -StatE SuRvEy , (5th

ed. 2006).
5. Edwards v. Arthur Andersen LLP, 189 P.3d 285, 296
(Cal. 2008).
6. Id. at 293 (citing Campbell v. Bd. Trustees of Leland
Stanford Jr. Univ., 817 F.2d 499 (9th Cir. 1987)).
7. Id. at 291.
8. REstatEMEnt (SEcOnD) COnfLIct

Of

Laws § 188 (1971).

9. REstatEMEnt (SEcOnD) COnfLIct

Of

Laws § 187 (1971).

10. Roesgen v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 719 F.2d 319,
321 (9th Cir. 1983).
11. Tiedje v. Aluminum Taper Milling Co., 256 P.2d 554,
555-56 (Cal. 1956) (holding where any agreement
contrary to the plain meaning of Section16600, or
the public policy for open competition, will not
support a cause of action in California).
12. CaL. CIv. CODE § 1673 (1872) (repealed 1941) (“Every
contract by which any one is restrained from
exercising a lawful profession, trade, or business of
any kind, otherwise than is provided [in sections
regarding a sale of good will or partnership
agreement], is to that extent void”; this statute was
enacted in 1872 from Field’s Draft, N.Y. CIv. CODE §
833.).
13. Hill Medical Corp. v. Wycoff, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779,
783-84 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001). See also Kolani v.
Gluska, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 257, 259-60 (Cal. Ct. App.
1998) (noting that it would be against public policy
to rewrite, or “blue-line,” an otherwise illegal
covenant not to compete into a narrow bar on theft
of confidential information).
14. See, e.g., Metro Traffic Control, Inc. v. Shadow
Traffic Network, 27 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 577 (Cal. Ct.
App. 1994) (citing Diodes, Inc. v. Franzen, 260 Cal.
App. 2d 244, 255 (Cal. Ct. App. 1968) (stating that
“competitors may solicit another's employees if they
do not use unlawful means or engage in acts of
unfair competition.”). Scholars have argued that the
invalidity of CNCs is correlated with a more vigorous
economy in high technology regions throughout the
nation. See generally Jason S. Wood, A Comparison
of the Enforceability of Covenants Not to Compete

and Recent Economic Histories of Four High
Technology Regions, 5 Va. J.L. & TEcH. 14 (2000)
(positing that the reason for rapid and continued
growth in California’s Silicon Valley may partially be
attributed to the lack of enforceability of covenants
not to compete because employers are able to
recruit high-tech employees who share their skills
and knowledge with new employers); see also
Ronald J. Gilson, The Legal Infrastructure of High
Technology Industrial Districts: Silicon Valley, Route
128, and Covenants Not to Compete, 74 N.Y.U. L.
REv 575 (1999) (discussing how legal infrastructure
contributes to the development of high technology
industrial districts); see also Christine M. O’Malley,
Note, Covenants Not to Compete in the
Massachusetts Hi-Tech Industry: Assessing the Need
for a Legislative Solution, 79 B.U. L. REv. 1215
(1999) (assessing the California model of
unenforceability of CNCs relative to the Boston Model
and its impact on high-tech industries).
15. CaL. Bus. & PROf. CODE § 16600 (West Supp. 2008).
The State of California rejected the common law rule
in 1872 when Civil Code sections 1673 to 1675, the
predecessors to the Business and Professions Code
sections 16600 to 16602, were adopted. SeeBosley
Med. Group v. Abramson, 207 Cal. Rptr. 477, 47980 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
16. See, e.g., Muggill v. Reuben H. Donnelley Corp., 42
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